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i'..tt-orney for Respondents
;"'llars

RICHARD L. YOUNG
Salt Lake County Bar
Legal Services, Inc.
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
Blomquist
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

This action was conunenced by American Savings & Loan
Association, which sought to foreclose a mortgage (trust
deed) against both appellants and respondents as parties
holding some interest in the subject parcel of residential
realty.

Appellants (Blomquist) had sold the property to

respondents (Sellars) on a Uniform Real Estate Contract,
subject to the mortgage.

After service of process by the

1ortgagee, respondents cross-claimed against appellants.
[n

turn, appellants counterclaimed against respondents,

isserting that respondents were in default under the terms
jf said real estate contract.

DISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW
After the trial court had earlier disposed of the
:-i.:;'i:12l rortgage foreclosure action by entering swnrnary
i!-: L'1vor of the rnort92aee, the '--Liirns of
respondents came on for trial.

Lmbc;

Upon stipuL1tion C\f tlH'

I ;arties in open court, it was agreed that certain facts were

uncontroverted, which facts were embodied in the court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The court then

jetermined that both parties were in default and that neither
was entitled to relief, whereupon the court dismissed the

:laims of both parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of dismissal
Jf their claims against respondents.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
On the 6th day of December, 1965, appellants entered intc
o Uniform Real Estate Contract with respondents.

q• 168)

(F.F. No. 2,

At that time, appellants were in the fact position
in the complaint of plaintiff American Savings &

Association and finally determined by judgment in favor
)f said plaintiff dated October 30, 1968.

(F.F. No. 3, R. 16E

Respondents made regular monthly payments until they werE
erved with swnmons by said plaintiff in the above-entitled
c,ction, at which time they discontinued regular payments.

-2-

t .

tiff on February 16, l 9G 7. ( l\. Gel)

<cLl

On or about February 27, 1967, appellants declared that
respondents were in default by failure to make said payments,
snd appellants demanded immediate payment of the full contract.

1:-,lcince in the amount of $33,885.87. (R. 76)

Simultaneously,

L

elected to treat the contract as a mortgage, as
xuvided in paragraph 16C of said contract (R. 32), and
:,-oceeded to foreclose same. (R. 75)
After said discontinuation of payments in February,
: %7, respondents commenced payments only upon the appointment
)f

a receiver o

(FF No. 4, R. 168)

The receiver was appointee

by

order dated November 14, 1967. (R. 96-97)
On October 30, 1968, the court entered summary judgment

in favor of plaintiff mortgagee and against all of the other

parties, foreclosing the plaintiff's mortgage, declaring
111 other interests inferior to those of plaintiff, and

ollowing a deficiency judgment against appellants (FF No. 1,
:i. 168)

The total judgment against appellants amounted to
including attorney's fees and costs of suit.

,R. 139)

Appellants took no appeal from that judgment, which

'.eft open the claims between appellants and respondents.

:R. 141)
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t

On January J, 1969, the latter claims came on for trial
:jd'Jre

the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow.

Al though the parties

' ere :xepo.red to testify, upon stipulation the parties agreed

::c
1

ta in undisputed facts which the cow_·t

dndings of Fact. (R. 167-68)

From those

f

i b;

.-1cts the court

I concluded that respondents were in default under their contra
with appellants. (C.L. No. 4, R. 169)

The court also concluded that appellants were:
"in default of the contract at the time it was
entered into and were subsequently foreclosed
and precluded from any further interest therein
for the reason that the provisions in the contract were dependent and could not be enforced
while in default and that the said Blomquists
were not entitled to foreclose the title to
property they had previously been foreclosed
out of themselves."
(C.L. No. 4, R. 169-70)
Consequently, the court entered judgment dismissing
appellants' claims against respondents, on the ground of
"no cause of action." CR. 1 72)

t

For that reason, the court

concluded that it was unnecessary to take testimony as to
damages. (C.L. No. 4, R. 169)
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS'
CLAIM, AS STATING NO CAUSE OF ACTION, WHERE
RESPONDENTS-VENDEES WERE CLEARLY IN DEFAULT
UNDER THEIR REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WITH APPELLANTSVENDORS AND THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT VENDORS
COULD NOT HAVE CONVEYED GOOD TITLE UPON RECEIPT
OF THE PAYMENTS REQUIRED OF VENDEES UNDER THE
CONTRACT.
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Th•,

court below ;1pp<Jrently proceeded on the assumption

;;r.J d12foc,ul t by the vendor with respect to the payment
=.;.

ur-.:::.'.erl:/ing obligc.tior. c.gc.inst the subject real property

:ecessc.rily excused the vendee from his obligations on the
:ontract.

'::"hat is not the law, here or elsewhere.

The basic rule has been clearly stated by this Court:
"(W)e acknowledge our accord with the rule • • •
that the vendor in a real estate contract generally not obliged to have full and clear
marketable title at all times during the
pendency of his contract of sale because,
ordinarily, title need not be conveyed until
the fin:i.l payment is made or tendered • • • •"
Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 U.2d 220, 357 P.2d 190, 192-93 (1960)
(emphasis added).
Similarly, in Woodard v. Allen, 1 U.2d 220, 265 P.2d
J98

(1953), this Court held that a contract vendee could not

justify his refusal to make payments under his contract by
claiming that the vendor could not deliver good title, since t
there was no requirement for conveyance of title until the
vendee had made the payments required of him by contract.
Accord:
')18

McKellar Real Est. & Inv. Co. v. Paxton, 62 U. 97,

Pac. 128 (1923); 55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser El 280,l '

pp. 724-25; Annot.-Time for Questioning Vendor's Title, 109
".LR 242 et seq.

Arguably 1 some support for the decision below could be
-5-
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.c:.':cn In\-.

'=o. ':.

horne, 59 LT. 156, 202 Pac.

contract he would lose both his pi1.yments to
,_,endor and the land to a foreclosing lienor.

insolvent

dll

However, certai

critical facts distinguish that case from ours:
"It should be borne in mind that the premises
described in the contract between Romney and
the defendant included only a part (in fact
a small part) of the premises in the contract
given by McEwan to Romney. Romney was not
able to meet the payments due under his contract with McEwan merely by the defendant
continuing to make the monthly payments
provided for in his contract. This is not,
therefore, a case in which the defendant
might have the right to demand that his payments should be applied in removing any
encumbrance upon or curing any defect in the
vendor's title."
202 Pac. at 549.

Thus, in Horne there was no prospect of paying off all
encumbrances on the large tract of land of which the contract
in question pertained only to a small part, looking only to
the contract payments, whereas in our case if respondents

had paid the $33,885.87 balance demanded by appellants after

cespondents had defaulted, appellants could easily have paid
off the mortgagee who, after another year of litigation,
finally wound up with a total judgment of $32,775.92
(including attorney fees and costs).
-6-
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c'11 the'

c']t',11·

t·itJ,·

i·;·e C3.lifornia Court of Appeals has so held:

1

"Plaintiff asserts that he was not tendered a
merchantable title, because • • • the vendor
did not tender him a deed to the property free
from encumbrance.

* .. *
"As to the fact that the record showed the
property to be incumbered with a deed of trust
• • • we are of the opinion that this defect
was remedied by the tender to the plaintiff by
the vendor's agent of the reconveyance by said
trustees. This reconveyance was properly drawn
and acknowledged; and it was handed to the
vendor's agents with the understanding that upon
repayment of the amount of the loan they were to
take the necessary steps to release the property
from the incumbrance. The vendor had a right to
rely on the purchase money to liquidate the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust.
Webster v. Kings County Trust Co., 80 Hun. 420,
30 N.Y. Supp. 357; Ziehen v. Smith, supra.
The $4,650 due at the time of the tender, and
the $1,350 already in the hands of the vendor's
agents, were more than sufficient for this
purpose."
Griesemer v. Hammond, 18 Cal. App. 535, 123 Pac. 818, 820
(1912) (emphasis added).

Does it change the result when the vendor has defaulted
1211

an underlying encumbrance so as to precipitate a fore-

losure action?

No, the California Court of Appeals has

e even after a sheriff's sale has
the Same .rul
-7-

"We believe that it is entirely clear that the
seller was not required to have title to the
property 0t the time of making the contract of
c.:3le, but W'Cls only required to be able to con·:Ey title to the purchaser at the time fixed
":Y.i ss.ic contract for such conveyance • • • •
Under -'.:'.le terms of said contract, the seller
h'2S '1.ct recuired to convey except 'upon receiving
the f d l ;::;urchase price' in installment payments
with interest as therein provided, or, at the
option of the purchaser, upon payment of the
entire unpaid balance of the purchase price at
any time prior to default by the purchaser.
But here respondent ceased making his payments
s'.-'.ortly after the foreclosure sale and at least
ten r.,cnths before the period for redemption had
expired and never made a tender of the balance
of the purchase price or any part thereof. This
was a breach of the contract by respondent unless
the mere permitting of the foreclosure sale constituted a prior breach on the part of appellants
relieving respondent from this obligation to continue such payments. In our opinion, it did not
•
•
•
o
In the present case there was no unremov able defect in the title because of the foreclosure sale, and the seller had a right to rely
upon the purchase money to redeem from said
sale. In this connection it may be stated that
while the indebtedness secured by the mortgage
was less than $5,000 at the time of the sale,
the evidence showed that there was $10,000
remaining unpaid on the outstanding contracts
of sale."
Lloyd v. Locke-Paddon Land Co., 5 Cal. App.2d 211, 42 P.2d
367, 368-69 (1935)(emphasis added).

In our case, paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real Estate
provides that "the Seller on receiving the payments
herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner
-8-

ju vc:::

mentioned cigrees to execute ,=md deliver to the Duyer
a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying

=.-.t::

-:i-=.le to the above described prer..h:es free ,-qnd clear of

Under the auU1ori ties 1>'e h-:1 ve ci teJ, the triL1l court
'eLLCd in dismissing appellants• claims against respondents.

CONCLUSION
Appellants are entitled to a reversal of the judgment
'.:if dismissal below, and the case should be remanded for trial

on the issue of damages or other appropriate reliefe

Respectfully submitted,

Richard L. Young
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants
Blomquist
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